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NOTICE IN RULE 23(b)(2) CLASS ACTIONS FOR
MONETARY RELIEF: JOHNSON v. GENERAL MOTORS
CORP.
Class actions brought under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure' have proven to be valuable in enforcing many
'Because of the interrelationships of the various parts of rule 23, entitled
"Class Actions," all parts of the rule pertinent to this Comment are here reproduced
for the reader's convenience.
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so re-
quests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
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private rights and public policies.2 Civil rights plaintiffs, in particu-
lar, have found the 23(b)(2) class action especially attractive.3
Many (b)(2) class action plaintiffs have won monetary awards such
as back pay in title VII employment discrimination suits,4 as
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the pro-
visions of the rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) deter-
mining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims of defense, or otherwise to come
into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs.
FEu. R. Cxv. P. 23.
2 "To consumer advocates, environmentalists, civil libertarians, and others who
would reform society through the courts, Rule 23 became a new charter. For those
who simply sought to enforce the laws as written, the new Rule provided means
by which large wrongs could be rectified though they caused individually small
(but collectively massive) injuries." Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?,
1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97. See also Chayes, The Role of the judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Huv. L. REv. 1281 (1976). For a discussion of the applicability
of class actions to various areas of substantive law, see generally 3B MooREs
Fu-ERAL PRsciicE f 23.02 (2d ed. 1978).
3 In 1978, civil rights class actions (1,477) accounted for 57.1% of the total
2,586 class actions filed in United States district courts. The balance of class
actions was divided almost equally among prisoner petitions, antitrust suits, and
securities, commodities, exchange and other statutory actions. See [1978] AD. OFF.
UNrED STATES CouRTs Di. ANN. REP. 226-27. Over half of the civil rights class
actions were job related. Id. 554. Most of those employment discrimination cases
were probably brought under rule 23(b)(2). See W. CoNoLy, A PRAcncAL
GUIDE TO EQUAL EmPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 511 (1975).
4 See note 12 infra.
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well as the usual equitable relief available under (b)(2), while
avoiding the often onerous procedures governing class actions for
damages under rule 23(b)(3). 5 Most significantly, (b)(2) plaintiffs
do not face a mandatory obligation to provide individual notice to
all identifiable members of the class.6 As a result, civil rights
plaintiffs have often been free from one of the major costs of class
action litigation that can hinder or deter private enforcement of
public policiesP.
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Johnson v. General Motors
Corp.8 may signal an end to the advantages of (b)(2) class actions.
The court ruled that individual notice to all class members is con-
stitutionally required in order to bind the class by the result of a
(b)(2) class action seeking injunctive and monetary relief under
title VII.9 Significantly the Fifth Circuit implicitly overruled
two previous decisions to reach this result.'0 The decision may
portend more difficult times for employment discrimination suits
in the Fifth Circuit.' L
This Comment is critical of Johnson. It argues that the Fifth
Circuit unnecessarily implicated constitutional issues and adjudi-
cated those issues incorrectly. It concludes that notice is not
5See FED. R. COw. P. 23(b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(2), & (c)(3), note 1 supra.
For examples of cases that have benefitted from the less stringent (b)(2) require-
ments, see Kelly v. General Motors Corp., 425 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1977); St.
Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 443, 450 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6 FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b) (2), note 1 supra. Individual notice for all identifiable
class members is required in (b)(3) class actions regardless of cost. Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). "[E]xcept in the most extraordinary
circumstances, the plaintiff must always bear the initial cost of giving notice."
Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.45, reprinted in 5 CLAss AcnoN REP. 134, 163
(1978) (footnotes omitted). See note 52 infra & accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Considine v. Park Nat'l Bank, 64 F.R.D. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1974)
(class certification denied in part because of prohibitive costs of notice); P.D.Q. Inc.
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (court tailored class size to
accommodate plaintiff's limited resources); Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61
F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (class allegations dismissed in part because named
plaintiff lacked funds); Notice Costs, 5 CLAss AcnoN REP. 2 (1978). See also
Dam, supra note 2, at 97-99; Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 1ALv. L. RPv. 426 (1973). But cf. Note, The Rule
23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1145-48 (1974)
(costs of notice in sample of class actions found to be insubstantial).
8598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. denied, 605 F.2d 554 (1979).
9 Id. 4.37.
10 In two employment discrimination class actions under (b) (2) which sought
monetary relief, notice was not required by the Fifth Circuit. Bolton v. Murray
Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.,
544 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977). The discussion in
these cases pertaining to the immediate issues was, unfortunately, minimal.
11 See notes 21-23 infra & accompanying text.
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constitutionally required in all (b)(2) class actions seeking mone-
tary as well as injunctive or declaratory relief. Requiring class
representatives to give other class members notice in (b)(2) actions
is a matter of discretion for the trial judge, to be exercised to
ensure adequate representation of all class members without un-
duly burdening prosecution of the class action. The Comment also
notes considerations which should inform the court's decision of
whether to require notice in a particular case.
I. Johnson v. General Motors Corp. AND ITS IMPACT
UPON CLAss ACTION LIGATION
A. The Johnson Case
Herman Johnson, a black employee at a General Motors plant
in Atlanta, Georgia, used 23(b)(2) as a vehicle to charge his em-
ployer with discriminatory employment practices under title
VII 1-2 and 42 U.S.C: § 1981.13 His complaint sought both injunc-
tive and monetary (back pay) relief. 14 The district court dismissed
Johnson's complaint, 15 holding that he was barred by the res
judicata effect of a prior class action, Rowe v. General Motors
Corp.,16 involving racial discrimination at the same plant. John-
son had been a member of the class in Rowe, but had never been
given notice of the suit. The class representatives in Rowe pre-
vailed on the issue of discrimination and won an injunction.
Although the three class representatives received individual settle-
ments of $1,000 each, they never sought classwide monetary relief.17
On appeal,' 8 the court ruled that Johnson's claim for injunc-
tive relief was barred by Rowe: "[A]n absent class member is
bound by the res judicata effect of a [prior] (b)(2) class action to
the extent that the judgment concerns injunctive or declaratory
12 42 U.S.C. § 20Ooe-2 (1976). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination
based on race, sex, national origin, or religion, and provides for injunctive relief,
reinstatement, and hiring, with or without back pay to remedy discriminatory
employment practices. Id. § 2000e-5(5) (g).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1981 gives to all persons in the United States "the same right
• ..to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens."
34 Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1979).
15 Id. 434.
164 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7715 (N.D. Ga. 1969), re'd and remanded, 457 F.2d
348 (5th Cir. 1972).
17 598 F.2d at 434.
Is Id. 432.
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relief, even when no notice was provided." 19 Johnson's claim to
monetary relief, however, could not be barred by Rowe: "Before
an absent class member may be forever barred from pursuing an
individual damage claim . .. due process requires that he receive
some form of notice that the class action is pending and that his
damage claims may be adjudicated as part of it." 20
B. The Probable Impact of Johnson
Although the Fifth Circuit was concerned with protecting the
rights of absent class members, the court has provided defendants
in 23(b)(2) class actions with a very useful procedural device to
combat the prosecution of the claims against them. At the initia-
tion of a (b)(2) class action for monetary relief the defendant could
request that the court order that notice be sent to all class mem-
bers. The defendant would argue that failure to send notice and
thereby bind all class members by the judgment would be unfair
and a waste of judicial resources; 21 absent a binding effect on all
class members, the action would be pointless. Although killing
the class action would likely be the primary motivation behind
the request,22 the absolute terms with which the holding in John-
19 Id. 438. Johnson had suggested four deficiencies in the Rowe litigation which,
he argued, should have released him from any res judicata effect: (1) The court in
Rowe failed to certify formally the case as a class action as required by rule
23(c)(1); (2) the Rowe court failed to define formally the class and its members
as required by rule 23(c)(3); (3) the court did not order notice for absent class
members; and (4) the class interests had not been adequately represented. Id.
434. The first and second of these alleged deficiencies were rejected by the court.
Id. 434-35. The fourth alleged deficiency was not reached by the court. Id. 438.
The third deficiency was accepted and is the subject of this Comment.
20Id.
21 To the extent that the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel is still recognized
in federal courts, absent class members may have a strong interest in receiving
notice, particularly so as to be able to participate in the judgment. In Schrader v.
Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1085 (1972), absent members were not permitted to enforce a class action
judgment in their favor because, due to the lack of notice, had the class lost the
suit, the absent members would not have been bound. But, as the Seventh Circuit
noted in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 n.25 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), the Schrader view is suspect because it depends on
a doctrine which is dying in the federal courts. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); 1B MoonE's FED AL
PaAc-ncE f 0.4.2[1] n.12 (Cum. Supp. 1979-80); RESTATEAMN (SEcoND) OF
JuDG.mNTs § 88, Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
22 Notice will give defendant little additional protection against subsequent
claims by absent members. Because the absent class members would be asserting
substantially identical claims, "the doctrine of stare decisis would apply in an un-
commonly powerful way." Dam, supra note 2, at 120. Professor Dam also notes:
Defendants will not normally place much value on binding class members.
if a defendant loses, the merger effect of res ludicata is usually irrelevant.
As for barring further actions by class members, it would be the rare class
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son is stated, and the constitutional grounds upon which it is based,
indicate that the request would probably be granted. Were that
result to occur, many (b)(2) actions would then be dropped, or at
least the prayer for monetary damages would be discontinued, be-
cause of the inability or unwillingness of the class representatives
to pay for the notice. 23  In some cases the notice requirement may
compel the judge to deny class certification either because class
members are impossible to identify and locate,24 or because the
costs of notice could be prohibitive when compared to the poten-
tial recovery.
25
In order to avoid the costs of notice, the class representatives
could request that notice be postponed until after the liability
stage of the trial. Class actions are often tried in a two-step,
"bifurcated" process.26  The first stage involves determination of
member who would attempt to tread the same ground as the unsuccessful
representative plaintiff. To the extent that class actions are the result of a
lawyer's entrepreneurship, second actions need hardly be feared, for what
entrepreneur would invest time and money in a venture already demon-
strated to be profitless?
Id. Accord, 37 Omuo ST. L.J. 386, 405 (1976). See also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (cohe-
siveness of (b)(2) class triggers stare decisis effect). Cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (warning against
the exaggeration of the "specter of an occasional successful collateral attack on the
basis of due process" where notice is inadequate); Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975) (suggesting that a distinction be drawn
between notice required to proceed with the action and notice required to apply
res judicata in subsequent suit). Also, if the facts change substantially after the
first suit, defendant would have to relitigate the matter as a new action. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JuDGMENTs § 68.1, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977); id., Reporter's Note, at 44; 2 NxwBERG ON CLASS Acno s § 2752 (1977).
23 The class representatives must usually bear the cost of notice. See notes
6-7 supra and note 27 infra & accompanying text.
24 See Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 51 F.R.D. 5402 542
(E.D. Wis. 1971). The court took judicial notice of the high turnover and
transiency of detained persons in the county jail. The denial of class certification
was based in part on the conclusion that "the effort which would be required to
give reasonable notice to those persons who would be affected by the judgment,
were this a class action, would create more problems than it would solve." Id. 542.
25 See Considine v. Park Nat'l Bank, 64 F.R.D. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). The
plaintiff contended that a class in excess of 10,000 members was entitled to recover
interest paid in excess of the usurious rate. The applicable statute limited recovery
to twice the amount of interest paid. One reason for denial of class certification
was that the cost of identifying and notifying class members "could be economically
prohibitive when compared to the potential recovery." Id. 648.
26 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
360-62 (1977); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d
437, 443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). The authority for this
practice may be derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) which in
relevant part provides: "[tihe court ... may order a separate trial on any separate
issue."
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liability and, if appropriate, class-wide injunctive relief. The
second stage determines the appropriateness and calculation of
individualized or class-wide monetary damages. If plaintiffs win
on the question of liability, the defendant may then be ordered
to pay the costs of notice.27 Support for this procedure may be
found in the Johnson opinion.
28
A defendant, however, could successfully resist postponement
of notice. If notice is delayed until after the liability stage, it is
clear that it will never be given in those cases where the defend-
ant wins on the issue of liability. But if the holding in Johnson
is given its fullest force, unnotified absent class members with
monetary claims would not be bound by res judicata and could
force the defendant to relitigate the same issues. The court would
likely agree that this is inefficient and unfair to the defendant.
29
Alternatively, the class representatives could attempt to limit
Johnson to its facts, producing an interpretation that due process
requires notice to absent class members only if the defendant's
liability has already been proven. Absent, unnotified class mem-
bers would then be bound by a verdict for the defendant on the
liability issue and the defendant would have no objection to post-
poning the issuance of notice. However, it seems that if the John-
27 The Supreme Court has made clear that the costs of identification and notice
in a (b) (3) class action must usually be borne by the plaintiff. See Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356-59 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974). See also Comment, Cost of Notice in Class Actions
After Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 78 COLUm. L. RBv. 1517 (1978). There
is no apparent reason why the rule should be any different for notice ordered at the
outset of a (b)(2) action. Most courts have imposed notice costs in (b)(2)
actions on the plaintiffs. 4 NEwazna ON CLASS AcioNs § 7992g, n.127 (Supp.
1978). However, as was held in Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98, 102
(W.D. Ky. 1973), af'd as modified on other grounds, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976), when notice is given after the defendant
has been found liable, the cost should be borne by the defendant Such orders
would not be prohibited by Oppenheimer because that case dealt only with cost-
shifting during the discovery phase of litigation, 437 U.S. at 356-59, and is therefore
distinguishable from a case in which liability has already been established. The
objection to cost shifting in Eisen was that it was based on a preliminary hearing
on the merits which was not authorized by the rule and was possibly prejudicial to
the defendant. 417 U.S. at 178-79. This objection does not apply when liability
has been determined during an initial stage of the trial itself.
2 8 "In some cases it may be proper to delay notice until a more advanced
stage of the litigation; for example, until after class-wide liability is proven." 598
F.2d at 438.
29 Cf. Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broad-
casting Co., 71 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (notice ordered in pre-liability
stage of (b) (2) class action for injunctive and monetary relief); Burwell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Va. 1975) (At pre-liability stage, and in
consideration of res judicata effect of a judgment in a (b) (2) class action, "[a]cting
upon the principal [sic] that every person to be bound by a judgment is entitled to
representation of their own choosing, this Court, in its discretion, will require that
notice be given.").
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son court had intended to so severely limit its holding, it would
have made that clear, or at least qualified the language of its hold-
ing. The court did neither. Johnson will be analyzed here in
terms of its literal holding that notice is constitutionally required
in all class actions seeking monetary relief. Other courts have
previously indicated support for this position,30 and yet other courts
will likely be urged to adopt it in the future.
II. THE UNNECESSARY CONSIDERATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Johnson court reached the issue of notice in (b)(2) class
actions seeking monetary relief only after it implicitly resolved
two initial issues: (1) whether or not monetary relief can be granted
in (b)(2) class actions and (2) whether or not notice is constitu-
tionally required in all class actions. These controversial issues
have yet to be settled authoritatively by the Supreme Court. A
clear majority position on each issue, however, has emerged in
the lower federal courts: monetary relief can be granted in (b)(2)
actions,3 1 and notice is not constitutionally required in all class
30 See Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 764 (2d Cir. 1975) (The
court stated with approval, "Plaintiffs had asked for an injunction ordering Grant's
to return money allegedly collected unlawfully. This was refused on the grounds
that such an award would in actuality be class-wide damages and thus unavailable
without proper notice."); Fertig v. Blue Cross, 68 F.R.D. 53, 59 (N.D. Iowa 1974)
(Although notice is not generally mandatory in a (b) (2) action, where $500,000,000
in damages is sought, "serious constitutional issues would be raised... unless notice
at least equal to that required by 23(c)(3) was ordered by the court under
23(d)(2)."); Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415, 417
(D.S.C. 1974).
31Although (b)(2) speaks only of "final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief," most courts which have considered the question have permitted
monetary relief to be sought in a (b)(2) class action. This position has been
adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. 4
NEwBEmG ON CLAss Acnoxs §7989 (1977). Two different rationales have been
used to reach this result One line of cases takes the position that the money
awarded is an integral part of the equitable relief that is granted. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); Rhodes v. Weinberger, 66 F.R.D. 601, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
This approach may be rooted in the "clean-up" doctrine of the courts of equity or
in the policies of title VII which are so often enforced through (b)(2) actions.
See 37 Omo ST. LJ. 386, 395 (1976). The major criticism of this rationale is
that rule 23(b) (2) specifically speaks of "injunctive" or "declaratory" relief, which
arguably excludes broader forms of equitable relief. See Note, Antidiscrimination
Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of
Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YA.LE LJ. 868, 878 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antidiscrimination
Class Actions].
The other rationale for allowing monetary awards in (b)(2) actions is based
upon the Advisory Committee note to rule 23(b)(2): "The subdivision does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predomi-
nantly to money damages." Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States District Courts, Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 73, 102
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actions.8 2 The issue in Johnson would never have arisen if the
court had not accepted these majority positions. For if monetary
relief can be sought and granted only under subdivision (b)(3),
then failure to provide notice, as required in all (b)(3) actions pur-
suant to subdivision (c)(2), precludes the res judicata effect of the
earlier suit.33  Similarly, if notice is constitutionally required in
(1966) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note]. These
words have been taken as meaning that monetary relief may be awarded as long
as it does not predominate over the requested injunctive and declaratory relief.
See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 1973);
Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The problem
with this approach is that "predominant" is almost meaningless. Cf. Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975)
(monetary relief may still be awarded although issue of injunction is moot); Rhodes
v. Weinberger, 66 F.R.D. 601, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("The crux is not the type of
relief sought but whether the alleged conduct of the party opposing the class is
such that injunctive relief is appropriate.").
Both of these positions have been criticized by commentators who believe that
rule 23(b) was structured to create mutually exclusive categories of class actions
based on the form of relief sought. See, e.g., Antidiscrimination Class Actions,
supra; Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The "Recovery Stage," 16 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 507, 519-27 (1975); Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in Title VII Class
Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. REv. 781, 797-803 (1974).
32 See, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1374 (6th Cir.
1977); Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1977);
Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S.
864 (1977); Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 958 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp.
619 (D. Kan. 1968), aft'd in part, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 951 (1971). Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4 (1975) ((b)(2) class
actions not seeking monetary relief may not raise constitutional issues).
Commentators have been nearly unanimous in their support of this view. See,
e.g., Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-17
(1973); 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE rfi 23.55, 23.72 (2d ed. 1978); 2 NEWBERG
ON CLASS AcTIoNs § 2550a (1977); 7A C. Wmcrr & A. MILLER, FEDEmL PRA~cCE
Ai PRocEDuPE: CrvL § 1786 (1972); Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding
Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARv. L. REv. 589, 605 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Collateral Attack]; Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due
Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1217, 1233 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Being Adequate]; Comment, Adequate
Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Pro-
vided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Adequate Representation]. But see Comment, Can Due Process Be Satisfied by
Discretionary Notice in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CnETGToN L. 1Ev. 268 (1971).
For a discussion of the rationale used in some of these cases and comments see
notes 65-76 infra & accompanying text.
At one time the Second Circuit held that due process required notice in all
class actions, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968),
subsequent appeal on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), but has since changed
its view. See Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975). Another
decision requiring notice in all class actions, Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972), has come
under increasing attack within its own circuit. See Jiminez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d
689, 700 n.25 (7th Cir. 1975); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n.3 (7th Cir.
1975); Hopson v. Schailling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 n.22 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
83 See FED. B. CIrv. P. 23(c) (3), supra note 1.
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all class actions, then the lack of notice in the earlier class action
precludes any res judicata effect of the earlier suit upon later claims,
whether injunctive or monetary.
Because the Fifth Circuit, prior to Johnson, had adopted the
majority position on these two issues, the Johnson court felt con-
strained to hold that notice is constitutionally required in (b)(2)
class actions for monetary relief. This was both an unnecessary
and unfortunate result. It is a highly regarded principle that courts
should not reach constitutional issues if a case can be decided on
other grounds.34 This maxim has potent application to treatment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which carry a strong pre-
sumption of validity.3 5 As written, the rules do not require notice
in a (b)(2) class action, yet they bind all class members by the
result; 36 Johnson is tantamount to invalidation of these rules.
The Johnson court based its opinion on due process when it could
have produced the same result-authorization for Johnson to pro-
ceed with his claim-without reaching any constitutional issues.
Two such avenues were open to the court.
First, the court could have held that Rowe had not been a
valid class suit.3 7 In Rowe, the district court had neglected to
formally certify the case as a class action.38 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit, in effect, retroactively certified that proceeding as a class
action.3 9  Although there was precedent in the circuit for doing
this under special circumstances,4 ° the wisdom of this procedure
was questioned by Judge Fay in his special concurrence in Johnson:
"As a matter of fact, Rowe was only a class action because we said
it wasl" 41 Such a use of judicial fiat must be seriously questioned,
34 8ee, e.g., Califano v. Yamasali, 442 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1979); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3 5 "[T]here is a strong presumption that the Rule qua rule is valid." 3B
MooP 's FEDERAL PRACICE 23-441 (2d ed. 1978). See also id. ff 23.02[5].
3 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3), supra note 1.
37 This issue was raised on appeal by Johnson. See note 18 supra.
3 8 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. 17715 (N.D. Ga. 1969),
reo'd and remanded, 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
3 0 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
40 Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973).
41 Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1979). Judge
Fay also noted "some of the problems [for Johnson's suit] created by our failure to
adhere to those procedures outlined in Rule 23. This should serve as a 'cautionary
signal' to all of us." Id.
The Johnson court explicitly relied on Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1973), to uphold the validity of the uncertified procedure. 598 F.2d
at 435. Bing held that, notwithstanding a failure to certify the class as required
by rule 23, a class action may still proceed. Bing is, however, distinguishable from
Johnson on two grounds. First, the court in Bing could "infer from the records
silence that all parties to the action knew of its class nature and acquiesced in it."
12.45
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especially when it unnecessarily implicates the Constitution. Even
if retroactive certification of Rowe is accepted, an exercise of re-
straint could have avoided the invocation of res judicata. If John-
son had limited its retroactive certification of Rowe to the issues
of liability and injunctive relief, as the Rowe court could have
done under rule 23(c)(4)(A),42 res judicata would not have barred
Johnson's monetary claims.43 Absent class members should be
bound only by those issues certified for class action.44
Inadequacy of representation by the class representatives in
Rowe provides the other nonconstitutional ground upon which the
Fifth Circuit could have decided Johnson.4 5  Although adequate
representation is, of course, a constitutional requirement, it is also
required by rule 23(a) (4). The plaintiffs in the earlier action
had settled their individual monetary claims for $1,000 each but
had failed to seek any monetary relief for other members of
the class whom they were allegedly representing.4 6 Although there
may be some question as to how strictly the court, on collateral
attack, should apply the rule requiring adequate representation, 47
485 F.2d at 446. The same cannot be said of Johnson. Johnson could not be
estopped to deny the class action nature of the suit He had had no notice of the
action and should not be held to have acquiesced in something of which he had no
knowledge. Second, Bing was still in litigation when the class action was retro-
actively certified. Rowe had been closed at least seven years by the time of
Johnson. Certification by implication requires an appellate court to assume many of
the fact-finding duties of a trial court. In particular, the appellate court must
determine the type of class action that may be maintained and the identity of the
class and its members. Such a task is accomplished more accurately while the
litigation is still in progress than seven years later, when the court must operate
from an old and cold record.
42 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (a), note I supra.
43 The complaint in Rowe sought only injunctive relief for the class. The only
back pay requests were individual claims by the three class representatives. The
decree granted by the appellate court did not mention class back pay awards.
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. f7715 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd
and remanded, 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
44 This rationale was utilized in Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 173 (1979). The court held that a prisoner's claims for
monetary relief were not barred by an earlier class action which did not consider
monetary relief. The court stated that "[gliven the lack of common questions of
fact as to many [individual monetary] claims, and the unmanageability of the suit
had they been included, we cannot believe that the district court would have
allowed the claims as part of that action if they had been potentially possible
[sic]." Id. 409. Jones-Bey v. Caso, 535 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1976), also seems to
have used a similar rationale in a similar case. The extremely short discussion by
the Second Circuit, however, makes it difficult to ascertain the precise reasoning
followed by the court.
45 This argument, although raised by Johnson, see note 18 supra, was not
resolved by the court. Johnson, 598 F.2d at 438.
46 Id. 434.
47 See Collateral Attack, supra note 32, at 604, which argues that a de novo
review of the trial court's determination of adequate representation is too broad,
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it seems clear that the court would have had to agree with John-
son on this issue. Because the Rowe plaintiffs did not attempt
to represent absent class members' monetary claims at all, it is
hard to say that they did so "adequately." 48
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE Johnson HOLDING
Johnson was not based on an interpretation of rule 23.49
The Fifth Circuit based its opinion upon a due process case de-
cided by the Supreme Court,50 Mullane v. Central Bank 6- Trust
Co.51  Johnson also cites Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,52 in which
the Supreme Court required individual notice to all identifiable
members of a (b)(3) class. Although some language in Eisen sug-
and suggests that class members should be relieved of the binding effect of the
earlier class action only upon a showing that the judge in the earlier action abused
his discretion when he found that the named plaintiffs adequately represented the
class.
Some courts have applied the standard of adequate representation to determine
the res judicata effect of an earlier class action. The leading case doing so is
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Alexander v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied) 436 U.S. 946 (1978);
Research Corp. v. Edward J. Funk & Sons Co., 15 F.R. Serv. 2d 580 (N.D. Ind.
1971).
4 8 But see International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). The court adopted a rather low standard of adequate representation,
requiring only a community of interests between representatives and class members.
It then held that the class representatives' failure to raise a damage claim which
;hould have been raised to avoid a "splitting of a cause of action" bad a "de
minimis impact on the representation issue." Id. 809. However, a holding that
there was adequate representation in Rowe would amount to supplying a defendant
with the power to preclude litigation of the rights of absent class members by
buying off the class representatives. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper,
100 S. Ct. 1166, 1174 (1980) ("To deny the right to appeal [from a district court's
denial of class action certification] simply because the defendant has sought to 'buy
off' the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound
judicial administration.").
49 Only three subdivisions of the rule mention notice: (e), (c) (2), and (d) (2).
See note 1 supra. Subdivision (e) applies only to notice of proposed dismissal or
settlement of the class action. Subdivision (c) (2) applies only to class actions
maintained under subdivision (b)(3). Subdivision (d)(2) applies to all class
actions, including the monetary (b)(2) actions in question in Johnson. However,
subdivision (d) is a list of orders which a court may make, not those which it is
required to make. This point was emphasized by the Advisory Committee when
it stated that subdivision (d)(2) "does not require notice at any stage, but rather
calls attention to its availability and involves the court's discretion." ADvIsony
Co m. NOTE, supra note 32, at 106. But see Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D.
62, 71 (D.D.C. 1972) (broad language of rule 23(c) (2) indicates policy of drafters
regarding (b)(1) and (2) class actions).
5o Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979) (quot-
ing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974): "Notice and an
opportunity to be heard are 'fundamental requisites of the constitutional guarantee
of procedural due process."').
51339 U.S. 306 (1950).
52417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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gests that its result may have been required by Mullane,53 the
stated basis of the decision is the Court's construction of rule 23.51
The applicability of Mullane to class actions, particularly to (b)(2)
actions, will thus be the initial focus of attention in our effort
to determine whether notice to absent class members is constitu-
tionally required.
A. The Mullane and Hansberry Decisions
Mullane involved a proceeding brought by the trustee of a
common trust fund for a settlement of accounts.55 The effect of
the proceeding was to terminate "every right which beneficiaries
would otherwise have against the trust company.., for improper
management of the common trust fund during the period covered
by the accounting." 56 The pertinent state statute required the
presence of two guardians at the proceeding: one guardian to
represent all the income beneficiaries and another to represent
those beneficiaries interested in the principal of the common fund.57
Although Mullane was not a class action, its language is broad
enough to apply to such actions:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.58
53 Id. 173-75.
54 "~e are concerned here only with the notice requirements of subdivision
(c) (2), which are applicable to class actions maintained under subdivision (b)(3).
By its terms subdivision (c)(2) is inapplicable to class actions for injunctive or
declaratory relief maintained under subdivision (b)(2)." Id. 177 n.14.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), provides strong inferential support for
the view that Eisen should be read solely as a construction of rule 23(b)(3). The
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, stated that because a rule 23(b)(2) action was con-
templated by the plaintiff in Sosna, "the problems associated with a rule 23(b)(3)
class action, which were considered by this Court last term in [Eisen], are not
present in this case." Id. 397 n.4. Although the Court in Sosna was dealing with
a request for injunctive rather than monetary relief, there is no hint that the Court's
view on the applicability of Eisen was dependent on the form of relief sought.
Many authorities agree that the Eisen holding should be interpreted as a con-
struction of rule 23. See, e.g., 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE If 23.55 (2d ed.
1978); 2 NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTONs §2225 (1977); Dam, supra note 2, at 110;
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 H-arv. L. REv. 1318, 1402 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
55 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306.
56 Id. 311.
57 Id. 310.
58 Id. 314.
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Upon these principles, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that
the statutory notice by publication was insufficient for the bene-
ficiaries whose whereabouts were known. Due process required
notification by ordinary mail at the very least.59
Mullane is not the sole relevant Supreme Court decision. In
Hansberry v. Lee,60 the Court stated in dicta that a judgment in a
class action could bind absentee members of the class. Due process
was satisfied not by individual notice, but by adequate representa-
tion of absent class members."' The earlier class action in Hans-
berry did not meet that standard because the class representatives
had interests which conflicted with those of the other class mem-
bers: "Such a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation,
whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably
the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not
afford that protection to absent parties which due process
requires." 62
The relative importance of adequate representation to the
question whether due process is being afforded in a class action
has been a matter of considerable dispute. Four possible relation-
ships, derived from the interaction of the notice and adequate
representation concepts, may satisfy the requirement of due process:
(1) Both notice and adequate representation are necessary-neither
alone is sufficient; (2) notice alone is necessary and sufficient; (3) ade-
quate representation alone is necessary and sufficient; (4) either
notice or adequate representation is sufficient-the combination is
not necessary. In holding that notice is necessary to bind absent
parties, the Johnson court adopted either the first or second of the
above positions. The analysis below argues that the Johnson
approach is wrong, and that the third position is correct.
B. Does Mullane Require Notice in (b)(2) Proceedings for
Monetary Relief?
Before proceeding to discuss the necessity of notice, it is profit-
able to dispose of the question whether notice alone is sufficient
to satisfy the demands of due process. This question is most clearly
presented in cases in which notice was given but in which repre-
sentation in the earlier class action was inadequate; in such a case,
is notice alone sufficient to bind absent class members, or should
59 Id. 319.
60 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
611d. 40-41, 42-43.
62 Id. 45.
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they be able to allege lack of due process for want of adequate
representation in the earlier suit? Because the precise dimensions
of this issue are beyond the scope of this Comment, it will suffice
here to point out that a number of authorities have reached some
agreement on the issue, concluding that due process does indeed
require adequate representation.6 3  Notice is merely "an addi-
tional safeguard; its purpose is to buttress the requirement of
adequate representation." 64 Hence, notice alone is not sufficient.
We turn now to consider whether adequate representation alone
is sufficient, or whether notice is constitutionally mandated.
Notice is not constitutionally required in all class actions if
Hansberry, and not Mullane, is controlling in the class action
situation. The majority of authorities have reached the conclu-
sion that, indeed, Hansberry is controlling, and that therefore
notice is not necessary in all class actions.65 The Johnson court
implicitly accepted this argument to the extent that only injunc-
tive or declaratory relief was sought in the class action.66 When
damages were sought, though, the court applied Mullane and de-
termined that notice is a requirement of due process.67  This
approach cannot be justified. Mullane does not control the class
action situation, regardless of the remedy sought.
The first major distinction between the Mullane situation
and the rule 23 class action is that in Mullane no party had an
economic incentive to represent adequately the interests of the
absent beneficiaries. The trustee certainly did not-in the account-
ing he became an adversary of the beneficiaries. 68 And although
the opinion does not specifically state how the guardians were com-
pensated, a conflict of interest with the beneficiaries was highly
6 3 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973); Being
Adequate, supra note 23, at 1231; Collateral Attack, supra note 23, at 605-06. But
see In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974) (notice alone satisfies due process).
64 Being Adequate, supra note 23, at 1231. See also Developments, supra note
54, at 1403.
65 Some cases and comments have explicitly distinguished Mullane to reach
this result. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); 2 NEwBERO, ON CLASS ACTONS § 2300a (1977);
Developments, supra note 54, at 1413-16; Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-
Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and Notice in Class Actions, 54 B.U. L. REv. 111, 139
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Fluid Recovery]; Adequate Representation, supra note
32, at 912-15. See also note 32 supra.
66 "[An absent class member is bound by the res judicata effect of a (b) (2)
class action to the extent that the judgment concerns injunctive or declaratory relief,
even when no notice was provided." 598 F.2d at 438.
6 7 See note 86 infra & accompanying text.
68 339 U.S. at 316.
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probable." If they were compensated on a standard-fee basis,
their advocacy would probably have been less aggressive than that
of the typical plaintiff's class action attorney who works on a con-
tingent-fee basis. If the guardians charged hourly fees, to be paid
out of the trust, the tendency would be to litigate excessively and
thus subject the beneficiaries' interests in the trust "to diminution
in the proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one who,
in their names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruit-
less and uncompensatory contest." 70 A similar situation could
never arise in a class action. If a plaintiff whose interests conflict
with those of potential class members attempts to file an action
under rule 23, certification would be denied for failure to satisfy
the prerequisite of subdivision (a)(4), mandating that the represent-
ative parties "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." 7" Subdivision (a)(4) applies to all class actions, and so
distinguishes the 23(b)(2) proceeding from that in Mullane, re-
gardless of the remedy sought.
A second and more important distinction is that the special
powers granted the trial judge under rule 23 72 make it far more
likely that representation will be constitutionally adequate73 in a
69 See similar analysis in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Adequate Representation, supra
note 32, at 912-13.
70 339 U.S. at 313.
71 Fko. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4). See note 1 supra.
72 See id. These powers include: the power under subdivision (c) (3) to define
the class so as to omit those persons who would not be adequately represented;
the power under subdivision (c) (4) (a) to limit the action's certification so as to
foreclose consideration of those issues, such as individual damages, which may
not be susceptible to adequate class representation; the power under subdivision
(c)(4)(b) to create subclasses in order to avoid representation of conflicting inter-
ests, and the power under subdivision (d) (2) to order that some or all class mem-
bers be notified of the opportunity to signify whether they consider the repre-
sentation to be fair and adequate. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23, note 1 supra.
73It is unfortunate that the language used in subdivision (a) (4), that repre-
sentatives must "adequately protect" the interests of the class members, is similar
to the language the Supreme Court used in Hansberry to describe the constitutional
requirement of adequate representation. To avoid confusion, this Comment uses
the term "constitutionally adequate" to distinguish the due process concept from
the concept of initially determining the quality of the named class representatives
under rule 23(a) (4).
The difference between the two concepts is clear when one considers that the
(a) (4) determination must be made at the outset of the litigation, before a judge
can possibly know whether the representation will turn out to be constitutionally
adequate. The court must use its various powers under rule 23, see note 72 supra,
to try to ensure that the representation meets constitutional requirements. Final
determination of whether the representation was in fact constitutionally adequate
must await collateral attack. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 31, at 106:
"Subdivision (c) (3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court con-
ducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment;
this can be tested only in a subsequent action."
19801
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class action than it was in the Mullane proceeding. Professor
Moore states that "the representative lawsuit under revised rule
23 has developed into a quasi-administrative proceeding, conducted
by the judge. This departure from the traditional view of liti-
gation as a strict adversary proceeding calls for a revised attitude
toward the parties and their advocates." 4 The lack of similar
judicial power in Mullane necessitated reliance on the adversary
model to assure the adequacy of representation. The parties had
to be given notice so that, if necessary, they could intervene and
represent themselves.75 This distinction between Mullane and
the (b)(2) proceeding again applies regardless of the remedy sought.
In sum, both of the above distinctions between Mullane and the
class action situation apply with equal force regardless of the relief
sought. The Johnson court, it seems, is therefore unjustified in
relying on Mullane for its holding that, to be bound by a (b)(2)
action for monetary relief, each class member must be afforded
notice.
76
C. A Better Test for Invoking the Notice Requirement:
The Nature of the Class
By focusing on the nature of the relief sought, the Johnson
court missed the more important and useful criterion for determin-
ing when to require notice: the nature of the class seeking relief.
The idea that there are two levels of "adequate representation" was recognized
by the Ninth Circuit in Souza v. Scalone, 563 F.2d 385, 386 (9th Cir. 1977), in
which the court explained that the adequacy of representation could be measured
against "a finer tuned scale" (the Constitution) or "the coarser scale of Rule
23(a) (4)."
74 3B MoonE's FEDMAL PIIACTTCEf i23.45[4.-5] (2d ed. 1978).
75 See Developments, supra note 54, at 1414-16.
76 In addition to the discussions of Mullane and Eisen, it must be noted that
the Fifth Circuit felt that Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 173 (1979), "largely control[led]" Johnson. 598 F.2d at 437.
Reliance on Bogard, however, is misplaced. In Bogard, the court held that a
prisoner's claim for damages was not barred by the res judicata effect of a prior
class action which had sought only injunctive relief. One basis for its result was
that the notice given in the class action was "insufficient to alert prisoners to the
possibility that they could seek individual money damages for personal wrongs."
586 F.2d at 408. Johnson implies that Bogard applied due process principles, 598
F.2d at 497, but Bogard did not even mention due process. It merely noted that
"[pirinciples of res judicata are not ironclad," and that it would be "harsh and
improper" to apply res judicata to Bogard's circumstances. 586 F.2d at 408.
The Bogard opinion also suggests an alternative ground for its result similar to
that discussed in notes 42-44 supra & accompanying text. Bogard's monetary claims
were not barred because they could not have been raised in the class action.
Bogard's most serious injury had occurred two months after the record was closed
in that proceeding. Id. 408. Furthermore, the Bogard court doubted that the
district court in the class action would have allowed damage claims, because they
would have made the class action unmanageable. Id. 409.
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The differences in the natures of typical classes in (b)(2) as op-
posed to (b)(3) proceedings illustrate the value of utilizing this
rather than the Johnson approach.
At base, the (b)(2) class is distinguished from the (b)(3) class
by class cohesiveness. Unlike many (b)(3) class actions, the (b)(2)
class action is ordinarily not suspectible to criticism as a "Franken-
stein monster posing as a class action." '7 Subdivision (b)(3) is a
broad category permitting class actions in diverse situations.78 Its
basic goal, "economies of time, effort and expense," 79 is achieved
by the aggregation of individual claims weighted heavily with
common questions of law and fact. 0 Subdivision (b)(2), on the
other hand, was designed primarily for facilitating class actions in
the civil rights area."- Injuries remedied through (b)(2) actions
are really group, as opposed to individual, injuries.8 2  The mem-
bers of a (b)(2) class are generally bound together through "pre-
existing or continuing legal relationships" 83 or by some significant
common trait such as race or gender.8s Although the interests of
77 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard,
J., dissenting). Antidiscrimination Class Actions, supra note 31, at 878-79, details
how the numerosity generally required of class actions is often distorted or disre-
garded in certification of (b) (2) employment discrimination class actions.
78 Subdivision (b) (3) "permits a class action in diverse situations where the
only limit is that the class action be a better method of settling the controversy."
FE. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3), note 1 supra. Note, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection
(b), 10 B.C. InD. & Com. L. REv. 539, 545 (1968).
79 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 31, at 102-03. For an extreme position
on this aspect of (b) (3) class actions, see Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defend-
ants Point of View, 10 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REv. 515, 518 (1968) (courts should
avoid certifying (b)(3) actions "unless the basic goal of efficiency is achieved
through the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation.").
80 See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HAv. L. REV. 356 (1967).
Professor Kaplan explains that the (b)(3) class action was "a new category de-
liberately created," id. 399, to deal with "the recurrent cases where a party's act
or omission has radiated outward to affect a large number of 'People ...... Id. 389.
"The object [of (b)(3)] is to get at the cases where a class action promises im-
portant advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue
dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the class or for the opposing
party." Id. 390. The article also provides insight into the Committee's concerns
with creating class actions like (b)(3) that are much more complex than the
"natural" class action, like those brought under (b)(1) and (2). See id. 375-400.
81 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 31, at 102; 7A C. Wmrsrr &
A. MusR, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PnOCEDun §§ 1775, 1776 (1972).
82 The requirement of (b) (2) that the opposing party must act or refuse to
act on grounds "generally applicable" to the entire group may be satisfied by dis-
criminatory conduct against any one member of the group. See Advisory Comm.
Note, supra note 31, at 102; 3B MooRE's FEDERA PRACTCE f 23.40[2] (2d ed.
1978); Note, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), supra note 78, at 544.
83 See 7A C. Wnrr & A. MILLER, supra note 81, at § 1786.
84 See Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372 (6th Cir. 1977):
"As we stated in Senter v. General Motors Corp., [532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir.
1980]
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the different members of a (b)(2) class are by no means identical,
the substantial cohesion of those interests makes it likely that
representative members can adequately represent the interests of
absent members and that the need for and interest in individual
representation will be minimal.85 Under such circumstances, the
contribution that individual notice can make to buttressing ade-
quate representation is not great enough to warrant a mandatory
procedural or constitutional requirement.
Johnson seems to accept this distinction to the extent that
only injunctive or declaratory relief is sought by the (b)(2) class.
In so doing, Johnson implies that monetary relief is destructive
of the cohesion that normally obviates the need for notice.s6 With
cohesion thus weakened, the (b)(2) monetary action becomes al-
most indistinct from the (b)(3) action, making notice necessary.
This proposition is not convincing. The notion that a re-
quest for damages automatically destroys (b)(2) class cohesion rests
on the assumption that monetary relief cannot be granted without
conducting a trial-like procedure on each class member's individual
damages.8 7 The assumption ignores the possibility of individualized
1976)], 'Race discrimination is peculiarly class discrimination ....' The class here
is homogeneous, as the discrimination in employment is claimed in all instances to
be on the basis of one common characteristic, the race of the employee." See also
Antidiscrimination Class Actions, supra note 31, at 884-88 (subdivision (b)(2)
classes are distinct "entity classes," defined by preexisting common characteristics
such as race or sex).
85 See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247-49, 256-57 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d
1167, 1168 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing (b)(2) in conjunction with (b)(1)
class actions); 7A C. WmGHT & A. MmL, supra note 81, at § 1786; Miller, supra
note 32, at 315-16; Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 31, at 106; Being Adequate,
supra note 32, at 1234; Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 426, 440-41 (1973). But see 37 Omo ST. L.J. 386
(1976).
The distinctions between (b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions may confront the
basic theoretical underpinnings of the class action. See Developments, supra note
54, at 1320-72.
86 The court stated:
When only equitable relief is sought in an action involving a cohesive
plaintiff group such as a class of black employees at an assembly plant, the
due process interests of absent members will usually be safeguarded by
adequate representation alone. As the Advisory Committee on Rule 23
stated, "[i]n the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and
the representation is effective, the need for notice to the class will tend
toward a minimum." Where, however, individual monetary claims are at
stake, the balance swings in favor of the provision of some form of notice.
598 F.2d at 437-38 (citation omitted).
8s Cf. Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir.)
(Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
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injunctive relief 88 as well as the broad discretion trial courts have
in calculating and disbursing damage awards.89 Courts are able
to fashion mechanisms to deal with monetary awards that avoid
fragmentation of the class action into individualized proceedings.
The rationale for a class-wide award was described by the Fifth
Circuit in the leading case of Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co.: 90
The method of computation will be a function of the
complexity of the case. If the class is small, or the time
period short, or the effect of the discrimination straight-
forward, a fairly precise determination of what each
claimant's position would have been, but for the discrim-
ination, is possible ....
However, when the class size or the ambiguity of pro-
motion or hiring practices or the multiple effects of dis-
criminatory practices or the illegal practices continued
over an extended period of time calls forth [a] quagmire
of hypothetical judgment[s] . . . a class-wide approach to
the measure of back-pay is necessitated.
Certain types of suits, such as title VII actions alleging dis-
crimination in promotion policy, are very amenable to class-wide
relief. Precise proof of individual damages, utilizing a "but for"
standard of proof, is almost impossible. Speculation that one em-
ployee would have been promoted instead of another cannot be a
fair and rational basis for any award.91 "The great purpose of the
back pay award, to make whole the innocent victim of discrimina-
tion, can be fulfilled only by taking a pragmatic view of the stand-
ards of proof ... ,, 92 When proof of individual damages has been
8 8 See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th
Cir. 1974):
The objection that back pay will vary from class member to class
member is not overriding. Once class-wide discrimination has been dem-
onstrated to result in disproportional earnings, a class-wide decision that
back pay is appropriate can be discerned without deciding which members
of the class are entitled to what amounts [citation omitted]. This is no
different than affirmative injunctive relief, in the form of red circling or
advance entry, which on remand will be applied to particular individuals
and not the whole class.
89 See, e.g., Gross, Remedies in Discrimination Cases, 29 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB.
129, 138-39 (1976); Developments, supra note 54, at 1516-36.
90 494 F.2d 211, 261 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
91 See id. 262 n.152.
92 Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 26 RurraEs L. 1Ev. 741, 766-67 (1973). See also Blumrosen, Wage Dis-
crimination, job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12
U. MIcH. J. L. BEP. 397, 495-98 (1979); C.A.R. Comment, 4 CLAss AcoN R Ep. 178
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wholly speculative, courts have based back-pay awards on the job
histories of adjacent persons on the seniority list,93 the averaging of
pay rates,9 and the maximum scale of wages or salaries which
could have been earned.95 Although an individualized remedy is
preferred, 96 courts should make use of their equitable powers to
calculate damages without requiring "unrealistic exactitude." 97
In such cases it suffices for the trial court to determine the amount
of back wages "as a matter of just and reasonable inference." 98
In fixing class-wide damages, a court balances the interest
of compensating victims of discrimination and vindicating public
policy against the employer's interest in not paying punitive
damages. At the same time, the court should be wary of award-
ing windfalls to persons who have not been injured.99 In sum,
there are simply too many relevant considerations, many of them
related to the facts of each individual case, to justify the gen-
eralization by an appellate court that notice is constitutionally
required whenever monetary claims are at stake. This is
not to imply, however, that there is no correlation between the
utility of notice and the form of relief sought. When only injunc-
tive relief is requested, the relevant facts usually relate to a gen-
eral pattern of conduct by the defendant. Because class members
(1975). But see Barnard, Title VII Class Actions: The "Recovery Stage," 16 Wmt.
& MARY L. PV. 507, 512-17 (1975) (back pay awards without proof of individual
injury are punitive and an abuse of equitable powers); Mott, Harnessing Class Back
Pay Relief Under Title VII: A Return to the Theory of Compensation, 4 CLAss
AMON Rr . 169 (1975).
93 See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 902-04 (7th Cir.
1973); United States. v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429,
443-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
94 See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 121-22 (E.D.
Mich. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 951 (1977). But see Ralston v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 431-33 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (rejecting use of
averages in distributing damages in (b) (3) antitrust class action).
95 See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 453 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973).
96 See Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977) ("an individualized remedy . . . will best com-
pensate the victims of discrimination without unfairly penalizing the employer").
97 Pettway, 494 F.2d at 260-61. Accord, Ostapowicz v. Johnson, 541 F.2d
394, 400 (3d Cir. 1976); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 239-33
(4th Cir. 1975). Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)
("primary [prophylactic] purpose" of back pay awards limits trial judge's discretion
to deny awards).
9 8 Brennen v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)).
99Because doubts are construed against the guilty employer, this process
usually favors an award. See Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d at 453.
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are unlikely to have much significant information not already
known to the representatives, notice may be of little benefit. In a
suit for damages, on the other hand, relevant information pertain-
ing to individual injuries is probably unknown to the class rep-
resentative. Notification capable of eliciting such information
would be beneficial in these cases. Although this correlation is
not perfect, 0 0 it is sufficiently substantial to be relevant to a trial
judge considering whether he should order notification of absent
members.
IV. DISCRETIONARY NOTICE UNDER SUBSECTION (d)(2)
The foregoing sections argue that due process in (b) (2) class
actions, regardless of the relief sought, is satisfied by adequate
representation. Notice need not be provided in every (b) (2) action
seeking monetary relief but, as subsection (d) (2) provides, should
be ordered at the discretion of the trial court.'0 ' This section of
the Comment outlines, in a very general way, the types of con-
siderations of which the court should take cognizance in exercising
this discretion.
In essence, the proper exercise of discretion necessitates bal-
ancing, on an ad hoc basis, the benefits of notice to the absent
class members against the consequent burdens to the class repre-
sentatives and, in turn, to the enforcement of public policy.'0 2 The
two major benefits ' 03 are the notification of class members of their
10 0 In some class actions involving monetary claims all of the information nec-
essary in order to award monetary relief will be obtainable by the class representa-
tive from the defendant's records. It is also possible that some non-monetary class
actions would benefit greatly by using notice to elicit information from absent
class members.
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2), note 1 supra.
1o2 In a different context, the Supreme Court has written that "due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Whether due process requires
certain procedural safeguards may be determined by balancing, among other things,
the public and private interests at stake, and "the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334-35 (1976).
103A third benefit of notice in (b) (3) class actions is notification of the right
to "opt out." See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2), note 1 supra. Such a benefit generally
does not exist in (b)(2) actions, however. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), note 1
supra. Most authorities and courts agree that class members may exclude them-
selves from (b)(2) class actions only under special circumstances, as the court's
discretion may allow. See, e.g., 3B MooRm's FEDERAL Prc'ncE If 23.40[4] (2d ed.
1978); 2 NEwBERG oN CLAss AcnONs § 2560(a) (1977). The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, has at least twice permitted (b)(2) class members to opt out. See Bogard
v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 s. Ct. 173 (1979);
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 n.154 (5th Cir. 1974).
See aho DeGier v. McDonald's Corp., 76 F.R.D. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Women's
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rights to intervene and the solicitation of useful information from
the unnamed class plaintiffs. 04 The financial burdens of notice
on the representative parties 105 and the social cost to society of
discouraging the private enforcement of public policies 10 are the
two major elements to be weighed against the benefits of providing
notice.
Certain factual circumstances in a given case will, however,
lessen the relative importance of one or more of these factors.
Providing notice of the opportunity to intervene will not be sig-
nificantly beneficial where it is unlikely that any class members
would be motivated to intervene.107 Such will be the case when
the class is very cohesive and will thus be willing to trust the named
plaintiffs to represent them, or when the potential individual
recovery is so small that it makes personal legal representation
financially prohibitive.
The impact of the solicitation of information will be mini-
mized in two common situations. First, when the reward for
responding to notice is uncertain because liability has not yet been
adjudicated and the potential individual recovery is small, a large
percentage of the class members may not respond to the notice.108
Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 71 F.R.D.
666 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
104 Information can be useful in two ways. First, it may inform the class
representatives of new facts, claims, or arguments that will improve the substantive
case for the class. Second, the information may aid the judge in administering the
class action and in ruling on such matters as class certification, subclasses, class
definition and adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Robinson v. Union Carbide
Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1261-65 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 822 (1977); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 71 (D.D.C. 1972).
lOU Although the main burden related to notice is its cost, in uncommon cir-
cumstances notice may strain the relationships in the community that are bound
up with the class action. See Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295 (D.
La. 1970) (notice by publication of a suit alleging discriminatory police practices
against blacks denied because it might have inflamed race relations in the
community).
106 The social cost of deterring constitutional or statutory class actions has been
explicitly acknowledged by courts when considering whether notice should be sent.
See Bachman v. Collier, 73 F.R.D. 300, 306 (D.D.C. 1976); Redhail v. Zablocki,
418 F. Supp. 1061, 1067 (E.D. Wis. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Watson v.
Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 959 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
107 Notice is also unnecessary for this reason when the entire class is already
aware of the action and of its right to intervene. See Mungin v. Florida E.C. Ry.,
318 F. Supp.. 720, 732 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971) (notice of the possibility of separate
representation held unnecessary because it was clear that members of the class were
already informed).
108 Motivation by threat rather than by reward is not permissible. Notice con-
taining an "opt in" provision, requiring class members either to respond to notice
or to forfeit their share in any recovery, has been held improper. See, e.g., Robinson
v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 822 (1977). Given the perceived lack of financial reward for responding, or
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Second, any information which is received will be of very little
value when almost all of the relevant facts are already known by
the class representatives or are easily obtainable from the defend-
ant's records, such as an employer's hiring and promotion records.
The cost of notice-a factor mitigating against an order requir-
ing notice-will be relatively small when the notice can be given
through means other than individually mailed letters. Notices
can be posted on employee or union bulletin boards, read over an
intercom system, or included in the plant or company newspaper.10 9
Lesser savings can be realized by including printed notices in some
of the defendant's periodic mailings to the plaintiff class, such as
credit card billings or governmental social insurance monthly pay-
ments." 0 Court orders under 23 (d) (2) directed to the defendant
may be necessary to effect notice by one of these alternate means.-"
The potential social costs resulting from the inability or un-
willingness of the representatives to proceed with litigation will
not be present, of course, where the representative plaintiffs are
both willing and able to pay for notice. 112 This will likely be the
case when the size of the class or the means of giving notice make
the expenses insignificant, or when the resources of the class repre-
sentatives and the potential monetary recovery are substantial.
CONCLUSION
The factors noted in the preceding section are hardly meant
to be exhaustive of the list of elements which a trial court might
want to consider when, under rule 23 (d) (2), it decides whether or
or not to order notice in a rule 23 (b) (2) class action. Rather, the
foregoing discussion seeks to emphasize the mistake that the John-
son court made when it held that the res judicata effect of (b) (2)
absence of threat to a potential award by not responding, a large percentage of
class members may not take the time to respond to notice. See, e.g., Kom v.
Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972), where 75% of the class
failed to respond to a notice requesting individual damage claim statements prior
to adjudication of liability.
109 See, e.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir.
1972) (posted or intercom announcements); Collins v. Schoonfeld, 344 F. Supp.
257 (D. Md. 1972) (posted announcements); Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing &
Furnishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415, 417-18 (D.S.C. 1974) (plant newspaper).
110 Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 180 n.1 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part) (individual notice could in certain instances be effectuated
through the least burdensome means, such as billing statements and payroll deduc-
tion plans).
111 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(2), note 1 supra.
112 The burden is also relieved when notice can be charged to the defendant
after he has been found liable. See note 27 supra.
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proceedings on absent class members shall turn solely on the nature
of the relief requested. Johnson will inevitably have an adverse
impact on (b) (2) class actions, and this impact is not required by
either rule 28 or the constitutional guarantee of due process; one
distressing aspect of Johnson is that these basic issues did not even
have to be addressed by the Fifth Circuit in this case. Such a flat,
nondiscretionary notice requirement is an unfortunate rule of
procedural law which should not be adopted or extended by other
federal courts.
